

An open teaching resource from John Girdwood at [Political Pipeline](#)

### Structures, Institutions, Parties, Politics 45 Minutes

**PART I:** Hand out cover sheet (this page), 1 copy to each student; 50 students means 50 copies; every student takes ONE article summary paper (see below). There are 10 summaries, so for 50 students make 5 copies of the 10 different summaries.

**10 Minutes: Silent Reading and Critical Thinking.** Write down your answers to the questions below after carefully reading the 1 page summary you were given.

**1. In two-three sentences, what is the author's main point—evidence for that point?**

**2. What is the best quote from your reading? Why?**

**PART II:** Find your group members—others in class who also read and wrote on *same summary*. Do a 1 minute interview: name, major, place on campus to go eat... 5 minutes.

**5 Minutes:** Group talk about your answers—1 person starts, and the student to right reads next, until done. Each reader should explain why they thought their sentence represented the material well.

**5 Minutes:** Group discussion about “Why this research is meaningful” and create an integrated “Best Answer” for 1 and 2.

**Group answer to Q. 1:**

**Group answer to Q. 2:**

Spokesperson: \_\_\_\_\_ **Group Name:** \_\_\_\_\_

**PART III: 20 – 35 Minutes:** Group Names announced and each group spokesperson addresses the center of the room and explains: (1) the group's main point of the summary and (2) the group's best quote.

\*\*\*Instructor will pile on important information between groups in order to create a master *lecture*. Article summaries are often actual excerpts or from book reviews. I have given credit when necessary, but these print material do not necessarily represent the entire article / book / website.

I suggest the instructor use the following sequence: **Group 3, 7, 6, 2, 1, 10, 8, 4, 5, 9.**

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1. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Front\\_%28France%29](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Front_%28France%29)

**\*\*\*Note: do not use Wikipedia in you essays—only J-Stor articles allowed for this class.**

**Front national** (French pronunciation: [\[fʁ̥̃.na.sjɔ̃ˈnal\]](#)) is an economically protectionist, [socially conservative](#) nationalist party. The party was founded in 1972, seeking to unify a variety of [French nationalism currents](#) of the time. [Jean-Marie Le Pen](#) was the party's first leader and the undisputed centre of the party from its start until his resignation in 2011. While the party struggled as a marginal force for its first ten years, since 1984 it has been the unrivalled major force of French right-wing nationalism.<sup>[2]</sup> The FN has established itself as the third largest political force in France, after the [Union for a Popular Movement](#) (UMP) and the [Socialist Party](#) (PS).<sup>[3][4]</sup> The [2002 presidential election](#) was the first ever in France to include a right-wing nationalist candidate in the run-off, as Le Pen beat the socialist candidate in the first round. In the run-off, Le Pen nevertheless finished a distant second to [Jacques Chirac](#). Due to the French electoral system, the party's representation in public office has been limited, despite its significant share of the vote.<sup>[5]</sup> The current leader of the party is [Marine Le Pen](#), who took over from her father in 2011.

Its major current policies include economic [protectionism](#), a [zero tolerance](#) approach to [law and order](#) issues, and [Anti-immigration](#). Since the 1990s, its stance on the [European Union](#) has grown increasingly [eurosceptic](#). The party's opposition to immigration is particularly focused on non-European immigration, and includes support for deporting illegal, criminal, and unemployed immigrants; its policy is nevertheless more moderate today than it was at its most radical point in the 1990s.

Some earlier party officials have historically been subject to controversy for occasionally promoting [historical revisionism](#), specifically related to the [Second World War](#).

The FN springs from a far-right tradition in France that dates back to the [French Revolution](#) of 1789,<sup>[6]</sup> and the party rejects both the revolution and its legacy.<sup>[7][8]</sup> One of the primary progenitors of the party was the [Action Française](#), founded at the end of the nineteenth century, and its descendants in the [Restauration Nationale](#),<sup>[9]</sup> a pro-monarchy group that supports the claim of the [Count of Paris](#) to the French throne.<sup>[10]</sup>

In 2005, Jean-Marie Le Pen considered in the far-right weekly magazine [Rivarol](#) that the German occupation of France "was not particularly inhuman, even if there were a few blunders, inevitable in a country of [220,000 square miles]" and in 1987 referred to the Nazi gas chambers as "a point of detail of the history of the [Second World War](#)." He has repeated the latter claim several times.<sup>[141]</sup> Also in 2004, Bruno Gollnisch said « I do not question the existence of concentration camps but historians could discuss the number of deaths. As to the existence of gas chambers, it is up to historians to speak their minds ("de se déterminer") ». <sup>[142]</sup> Jean-Marie Le Pen received fines for this sentence, Bruno Gollnisch was found not guilty by the courts of cassation.<sup>[143][144][145]</sup> The current leader of the party, Marine Le Pen distanced herself for a time from the party machine in protest against her father's comment.<sup>[146]</sup> Mme. Le Pen has, during the 2012 presidential elections, worked hard to align herself with the many Jewish people in France, in an attempt to obtain their support in the election like her father in 1988 when he went to see the World Jewish Congress.<sup>[147]</sup>

2. [Is France Racist?](#)  [Nonna Mayer](#), [Rosemary Morris](#)

*Contemporary European History*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 119-127

What is Racism: One: there is a correlation between genetic inheritance on the one hand, and intellectual aptitude and moral tendencies on the other. Two: this inheritance, which governs the aptitudes and tendencies, is common to all members of certain human groups. Three: these groups, or 'races', may be ranked according to their genetic inheritance. Four: these differences entitle the 'races' which are held to be superior to rule and exploit the others, and potentially to destroy them.

Is France racist, as Michel Wieviorka has suggested in a recent book? And if so, why? Is France more or less racist than her European neighbours, and is the degree of racism increasing or decreasing? These questions are being hotly debated in the wake of the electoral successes of the National Front, which is seen as a 'racist' party by three-quarters of French people old enough to vote.

Le Pen's party does well not because the French are more racist than their neighbours but because of the economic and political state of France in the 1980s, because the other parties could not agree on a strategy to deal with the Front and because of the latter's own political resources - leadership, organisation and agenda.

Table 3. *Index of xenophobia by country\**

%	+
Greece	34
Belgium	22
France	20
Denmark	18
Germany	13
UK	13
Italy	11
Netherlands	11
Luxembourg	9
Portugal	9
Spain	7
Ireland	5
EC	14

The value '+' corresponds to respondents who agree with at least two of the following statements: there are too many people of another nationality/the presence of people from another nationality (another race) is disturbing (Eurobarometer 42, 1994/in Anna Melich, 'Comparative European Trend Survey Data on Racism and Xenophobia', ECPR/Bordeaux, 27 April-2 May 1995).

3 **The European Christian Democrats** Anthony Trawick Bouscaren: T  
The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Mar., 1949), pp. 59-73:  
University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science

In Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy Christian Democrats are the largest parliamentary party; in France they are second, and in Switzerland, third. The German Christian Democrats are a majority in the state legislatures of the western zones and in the Bizonal Government

The Christian Democrat parties have, for the most part, a social and political heterogeneity which distinguishes them from the Liberal, Socialist, and Communist political groupings; they are the only political parties in continental Europe which are similar to major American parties, in that they cut across the great interest groupings of the population.

Christian Democracy further holds that democracy is government by and for the people; that it must include political freedoms of speech, press, assembly and vote, admitting that such liberties must be actuated with proper regulations so as not to become through abuse dangerous to society itself; that modern democracy cannot exist without parliaments, and must preserve as distinct the state legislative, executive, and judicial powers; that true democracy must be based on social justice which avoids economic exploitation of certain classes and gives to all the opportunity for well-being and betterment. The Christian Democrat is convinced that modern democracy is the fruit of Christian civilization, and that a democrat should give prevailing value to morality in public life.

The main emphasis of most Christian Democrat programs is upon the need of reintegrating the laboring man into society by making him a responsible partner in the economic process of which he is part. The Industry Council Plan is Christian Democracy's principal technique for establishing genuine economic democracy, in order to raise labor to a partnership with capital, and to eliminate economic autocracy.

Although they are in large part Catholics, Christian Democrats emphasize that they are not a "Church party," and that they appeal to all men of good will who accept their political program. In France one of the founders of the Christian Democratic Movement Republicain Populaire was Pasteur Lagraviere, a Protestant minister. The German Christian Democrats include many Protestants such as Dr. Holzapfel, Vice President of the Christian Democratic Union for the British zone, Dr. von Prittwitz-Gottron, and Dr. Baeumer, both prominent in the Christian Social Union in Bavaria. In some areas, notably in the state of Württemberg-Baden, Protestants are in the majority on Christian Democrat committees.

4. Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ across Electoral Systems by Thomas Stratmann and Martin Baur  
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Jul., 2002), pp. 506-514 Published

This article documents that the committee assignments of FPTP and PR legislators are systematically different, which is consistent with the hypothesis, that both legislator types cater to different electoral groups and that they pick committees (or that parties pick committees for them) that are best suited to put them into a position to enable them to satisfy their constituencies, and thus to increase their chances of reelection.

This finding is established without confounding country effects with electoral rule effects, which arises when examining the behavior of legislators in countries that use only one electoral rule. By analyzing the behavior of German legislators, who are subject to differing rules we can distinguish between the incentive effects of plurality rule and proportional representation. While FPTP legislators are members of committees which allow them to have influence over the allocation of benefits to their geographic reelection constituency, PR legislators are members of committees which allow them to have control over funds that benefit their party's reelection constituencies.

Contrary to the previous literature on the German legislature, we find that there are indeed significant differences between both legislator types. Thus, electoral rules have a significant influence on day-to-day legislative behavior, which in turn affects government policy. While the notion that the FPTP system is most likely to lead to pork barrel politics also suggests that government size is larger under this electoral rule, incentives for pork barrel politics also exist under PR. In fact, many European governments that employ the PR system have a larger government than FPTP countries. Our findings point to one reason that European countries that employ PR do not have a smaller government size than countries that employ FPTP, namely that PR legislators have incentives to direct spending to constituencies that are potential supporters of their party, regardless of their geographic location.

**Committee System** The German legislature, the Bundestag, does much of its business through its permanent (standing) committees. The issue areas of standing committees mirror, for the most part, the policy issues for which the government ministries are responsible. Bills originate from the executive and from the parliamentary parties. Legislation is referred to the committees from these two sources, and committees are required to make a recommendation which may include amendments to the legislation regarding passage of the bill to the entire legislature. About 60 percent of the bills are modified at the committee stage. In addition to modifying legislation, committees provide "infrastructure for communications and information between members of parliament, government ministers, bureaucrats, and interest groups" (Saalfeld 1998, 58). Further, "committees [in the German legislature] play a major part in giving . . . legislative output its final shape" (Johnson 1979, 135). Committees are assigned after the election, at the beginning of a new legislative session. Legislators indicate their committee preferences to their party, and the party caucus determines the final committee assignments (Kaack 1990). Legislators can be fairly independent in choosing their specialization (Hiibner 1995). Parties allocate seats according to personal preferences of legislators, representativeness of various political groups within the party, and representativeness of the various German regions (Johnson 197; Ismayr 1992, 189). Once each legislator has voiced his preference, party whips formulate a proposal for committee assignments which requires consent by the party caucus (Fraktion). If there exists a greater demand for seats on a particular committee than there are slots, intra-party bargaining occurs to achieve an agreement. FPTP members appear to be in a better bargaining position and are more likely to obtain their first choice of committee seat. "Where they [FPTP members] really want to have it their way, mostly in matters of interest to their voting districts, they can mobilize considerable bargaining power within their parliamentary groups" (Patzelt 2000, 38).

5.

Democracy or One Party State? Reflections on the UK Election, **1992**: Ankie Hoogvelt  
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 27, No. 17 (Apr. 25, 1992), pp. 880-881

It is a cherished British myth that democracy is one of the finest things they gave to the world. When are the British going to learn that their particular brand of democracy-based on 'first-past-the-post' in each of the 651 constituencies-is no democracy at all, but a recipe for a one party state?

FOR the fourth time running the British Conservative Party has sailed into electoral victory with 43 per cent of the national vote, on a 77 per cent turnout at the ballot box. Once again about two-thirds of the British people will bow to the expressed wish of one-third of their com-patriots and suffer five years of Tory rule. The British people have always been very proud of their democracy. Indeed, it is a cherished national myth that democracy is one of the finest things they gave to the world! When are the British going to learn that their particular brand of democracy (a system based on 'first-past-the-post' in each of 651 constituencies) is no democracy at all, but under conditions of the late 20th century has become a recipe for a one party state?

The Tory victory came during the worst recession for over 60 years, and after 13 years of gross mismanagement of the economy. Manufacturing output is just below where it was 13 years ago; GDP over the period has grown by a pathetic 1.5 per cent per annum, unemployment has risen from 1.1 million to over 2.6 million, income inequalities have widen-ed. The number of people on Income Support (the government's own official poverty line) have nearly doubled from just under 7 million in 1979 to over 12 million today. As consumer debt has galloped to 130 per cent of GDP, so bankruptcies and house repossessions have soared to record levels. The national health system is in tatters; infrastructure for education a national scandal, and poverty related crime has turned the streets of the inner cities into no go areas.

The idiosyncratic British electoral system has now log-jammed the polity into one party state in perpetuity. Demographic changes reflected in successive constituency boundary changes have tended to consolidate the gains for the Conservatives: as the upwardly mobile have moved out of the inner city Labour strongholds of the north into Tory territory in the south, so have seats been liquidated in the north and new ones been created in the south. The next decennial Review of the Boundary Commission in 1994 is widely expected to yield between 12-20 more such 'safe' Conservative seats. This will make it completely impossible ever to remove the Tories from office under the present electoral rules. In other European countries, the solidarities of territory have waxed as the solidarities of class has waned. Broad-based progressive coalition parties have succeeded in salvaging some form of social agenda and national public integrity from the privatizing monetarist whirlwind that blows through the world economic system. If the British people want to do the same there is only one way forward: an electoral pact between the Liberal Democrat and the Labour Party, if not nationally, at a minimum in marginal constituencies.

6.

[Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament](#)

Simon Hix, Abdul Noury, Gérard Roland

*American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Apr., 2006), pp. 494-511

In this article, we assess three explicit strategies (based on three logics of political integration) as possible solutions to the European Union's legitimacy problems. The first strategy amounts to a scaling down of the ambitions of the polity-makers in the European Union (EU). The second strategy emphasizes the need to deepen the collective self-understanding of Europeans. These two modes of legitimation figure strongly in the debate on aspects of the EU, but both have become problematic. The third strategy concentrates on the need to readjust and heighten the ambitions of the polity-makers so as to make the EU into a federal multicultural union founded on basic rights and democratic decision-making procedures. Taking stock of the ongoing constitution-making process, the authors ask how robust such an alternative is and how salient it is, as opposed to the other two strategies.




FIGURE 2. *Europe as problem-solving regime*

Since the French Revolution, nation-states have not "existed in isolation as bounded geographical totalities, ... they are better thought of as multiple overlapping networks of interaction" (Held, 1995). This is a process very much speeded up by the EU, which has "established the bold idea to disconnect nationality and citizenship and this idea may well evolve [in]to [a] general principle which ultimately transforms the ideal of cosmopolitan citizenship into reality" (Preuss, 1998: 149). In this respect, the EU is pursuing the modern idea of statehood, as divorced from nationhood: the polity is not bound by pre-political bonds. We are now witnessing a constitution-making process that may do the job, but because of present constraints the outcome is still uncertain.

Our conclusion is that the EU has taken a stride forward from just a few years ago in that it has embarked on a self-conscious process of forging a constitution. There is a sense among many of the members of the Convention and its observers that what we have been witnessing is of historic proportions. This process admittedly takes the existing structure as its point of departure, and the result is likely to retain many of the unique features of the EU qua polity. But the Draft Constitution not only offers a complex mixture of the three legitimation strategies, but the character of the mixture has changed. The Convention's work, if adopted, will move the EU in the direction of the third strategy listed above, from a partly derivative condominium-type entity and in the direction of a state-type entity. What we see is not a full leap, but nonetheless a major step toward finding a workable arrangement between the dominant strategies (One and Three) that run through the Draft and that also mark the Union.

This attempt deeply affects the Union's approach to values, an approach which itself reflects this tension and that is played out in the efforts to accommodate values associated with universalism and with deep diversity (Fossum, 2003b). In cultural terms, it is a matter of reconciling different value sets through an appeal to European values of a universal bent. In social terms, it is a matter of nourishing at the European level the sense of solidarity that was fostered by the welfare state. This makes for a complex accommodation of distinctively national, European, and universal values and principles. The European Union is still a work in progress.

7.

[Polish Women in the mid-1990s: Christian Democrats in a Country without a Christian Democratic Party](#) [STEVEN SAXONBERG](#)

*Czech Sociological Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (FALL 2000), pp. 233-253

This article discusses Polish attitudes toward gender in the early- to mid- 1990s. It shows that during this period, Poles on the average had 'Christian democratic values', although there were no Christian democratic parties in parliament during this period. The majority of Poles supported some type of 'social market economy', while maintaining traditional views toward gender roles and moral issues. Polish women on the average, though, were clearly more in favour of gender equality than their male counterparts. Age and years of education were also important factors in determining attitudes toward gender roles, while the Church was not as influential as expected. Furthermore, the gender gap was largest among those with a middle level education and smallest among those with a low level of education.

**Is There a Gender Gap?**

Above I maintained that Poles have a rather Christian democratic political orientation. Now we will investigate whether Polish women are more or less Christian democratic than Polish men. I kept the coding the same as in the original survey: man = 1 and woman = 2. Thus we should expect positive correlations if Polish women are more social democratic than Polish men.

Table 2. Correlation Coefficients

		<i>Factor 1: Economic Issues</i>			
	SEX	GOVINC	GOVJOB	REDISTR	WELFARE
SEX	1.0000 (4905)	0.0649 (4760)	0.0971 (4806)	0.0421 (4726)	0.0450 (4472)
		P = 0.000	P = 0.000	P = 0.004	P = 0.003
women for public sector		90.4%*	93%*	66.4%**	87.4%***
men for public sector		86.5%*	87.5%*	62.9%**	84.7%***
		<i>Factor 2: Gender Issues</i>			
	SEX	RUNHOME	MENPOL	WORKCHLD	
SEX	1.0000 (4905)	0.1210 (4495)	0.0961 (4338)	0.0804 (4759)	
		P = 0.000	P = 0.000	P = 0.000	
women for sex equality		53.6%*	44.2%*	49.6%**	
men for sex equality		41.2%*	34.8%*	42%**	
		<i>Factor 3: Moral Issues</i>			
	SEX	PROABORT	DIVORCE	RIGHTIST	
SEX	1.0000 (4905)	-0.0163 (4308)	-0.0193 (4084)	-0.0010 (4367)	
		P = 0.285	P = 0.218	P = 0.947	
women non-conservative		41.5%*	42.2%*	18.1%**	
men non-conservative		43.1%*	44.9%*	20.3%**	

Note: the number of cases is printed in parentheses. P is calculated for two-tailed



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8.

BASED ON: "Modernization: Theories and Facts" By Przeworski and Limongi (1997) *World Politics*.  
<http://politicalpipeline.wordpress.com/2012/06/26/does-economic-development-cause-democracy/>

Przeworski and Limongi look at 135 countries between,  
1950 and 1990.

All regimes were classified as democracies or dictatorships;  
101 democratic and 123 authoritarian; see,  
Accounting for 224 regimes.  
Dollars were held to 1985 prices.

Rapid economic growth is not destabilizing,  
For either dictatorships or democracies.  
However, poor democracies are extremely fragile,  
When faced with an economic crisis.  
In countries with an average income under \$2,000,  
12 democracies fell according to 107 years of data,  
The following year.

Yet when a country's GDP per capita income is above \$6,055;  
"A miracle occurs: in the 252 years during which  
Wealthy democracies experienced economic crises,  
None ever fell." [5]

Following Barrington Moore, [7]  
The Western European route to democracy,  
Was unique and furthermore; not expected to be repeated,  
For others around the globe.

Another key finding to understand:  
The stability of democracy increases significantly more,  
According to economic development in the *old regimes*,  
Rather than in the new countries.

In fact, the probability of transitions to democracy in *new countries*,  
Actually declines as new countries develop under authoritarian decree.

So the hope of modernization theory;  
That economic development will promote democracy,  
Is particularly disheartening,  
For new Third World countries.

Economic development actually lowered the probability,  
Of a dictatorship falling by 1.90 percent,  
In the *new countries*.

9.

BASED ON: [Draft] Deegan-Krause. 2006. New Dimensions of Political Cleavage. Oxford Handbook of Political Science, eds. R. Dalton and H. D. Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
<http://politicalpipeline.wordpress.com/2012/07/02/our-divides-shape-our-destiny/>

Issues divides: to rearticulate; attitudes married to institutions,  
Have been quite popular in the past forty years of research.

For instance, Sartori (1976) sees the programmatic left and right,  
Seeking the differences of market versus state distribution;  
Secularism against denominations,  
Ethnicity against integration, and,  
Democracy against authoritarianism.

For example, Inglehart (1977) locates material versus  
Post-materialist values. And many others examine,  
Domestic protection against international integration; or,  
Immigration v. globalization.

Thus, *issues* generally refers to “the interplay between attitude  
and partisanship.”<sup>[4]</sup>

Posner, *par excellence*, explores the conditions whereby,  
Cultural cleavages are politically salient in Zambia and Malawi.<sup>[6]</sup>

Through a natural experiment due to the division of the Chewa,  
And Tumbuka peoples in Malawi and Zambia, Posner documents:

Objective *cultural differences* between Chewas and Tumbukas,

On both sides of the border are *identical*;

However, the political salience in each state is totally different;

The different sizes of the tribal communities creates

Different strategies for power players to bargain for voting;

In Malawi, Chewas and Tumbukas are *large* groups visa-vis,

Within the border of the country; and thus become a foundation,

For political coalition-building;

In Zambia, Chewas and Tumbukas are *small* groups within the country,

And so not useful to mobilize a voting constituency;

Hence the political salience of a cultural cleavage may depend,

Not on the nature of the structure cleavage itself (i.e., identity),

Rather; the size of the groups in political competition!

The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and  
Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi  
DANIEL N. POSNER University of California, Los Angeles  
American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 4 November 2004

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10. This borrowed poem is an analysis of: Aldrich. 2011. *Why Parties?: A Second Look* (Chicago Studies In American Politics). <http://politicalpipeline.wordpress.com/2012/06/21/why-do-political-parties-form/>

A collective action problem is undertaken,  
When people decide to do something about,  
Public good benefits.

Imagine three parties from three regions,  
And the regional differences are salient.  
Each will submit a bill to the national government,  
To better the nation's internal / external development.

But passing all three bills would overtax each region,  
Particularly when the *others' solutions* are of little consequence,  
To the residents of *that one* particular region.

Region A and Region B,  
Will collaborate to prefer only *one*,  
Of the three pieces of legislation,  
With C forced to agree!

$R = PB + D - C$   
The outcome desired is the public good.  
This leaves room for democracy's roots.

R stands for Reward.  
P depicts the probability the vote  
Will make in deciding a *tie*.  
B stands for the differential benefit one gets  
From choosing the more preferred candidate  
D it for Duty!  
C stands for the costs of voting, including;  
Time and effort to register and  
The costs of decision making.

Apply it to the other expected utility riddles;  
Like the *calculus of candidacy*, and,  
Participating in interest groups, and perhaps,  
To a society that seeks to become civil. [8]

And if P is zero,  
expect very, very low turnout.

Of course, becoming *informed* is a serious hurdle.  
So research campaigns in light of these,  
Former two collective action... hurdles.  
Yes. Getting people informed, and... getting them to *vote*.