‘Twas the night before class,
And the professor was full of life, alas;
A practice-run of the lecture material,
Now at a glance.
For all written herein was meant to be,
Grasped by the students tomorrow,
Before the department party.
This is the lecture called:
- When you think of structure, you study:
- Capitalism, regime, state, or society.
- Structure is along those lines of inquiry.
- Recall Max Weber’s invocation:
- “The modern state is a compulsorily association
- Which organizes domination.”
- Recall, in 2003, Anthony Marx argued appropriately,
- That the people are served by the state, and that this service,
- Is the cause of the peoples’ allegiance to their regime.
- Today we shall focus on structure, yet let us ponder aloud:
- All states govern different territories with different cultures.
- Some states reveal congruence, yet others utterly fail to do so.
- Some endured for centuries, while others are new-comers.
- Are cross-national studies able to discover profound answers?
- Can you name just one nation-state, in history, whereby:
- No minority member of the population was ever used,
- By the dominant ethnic, religious, propertied or racial group,
- Ever coerced and/or manipulated for power—state rule,
- Whether as a scapegoat or as an undesirable fool / tool,
- For a dominant group to win via illegitimate rules?
- Doesn’t the “self-determination” line ring hollow like a lie?
- Do you pay your taxes? Doesn’t this prima facie cause,
- Every taxpayer to have a vested interest in the laws;
- The collecting government’s output montage?
- After colonial states formed, Migdal reminds us;
- The state, based on the normative European myth,
- Appeared often as “organized hypocrisy,” rather than,
- The peoples’ effective apparatus.
- Bear in mind multiple coups d’état, civil wars, criminalization
- Of state functions, and economic stagnation / regression,
- That occurred by the structure of said state apparatus.
- There was little or no liberalization or emancipation,
- In this organized compulsorily organization!
- In researching the state these early 21st century days,
- Use political trajectories or integrated comparative analysis.
- Political trajectories require history—the unfolding process:
- Account for issues of time, sequence and context;
- For world conditions during the state’s formation;
- For elites, social factors, institutions and conditions,
- Abundant during the critical junctures; therein,
- For capitalism’s development and adjustments;
- For the unevenness and uncertainty in state arrangements;
- For the type of governance: federalism or unitary structures;
- For the classes, i.e., Marxists, and society’s impact / punctures;
- For civil liberties and civil rights along structural lines;
- For path dependence—when other paths were ignored and why;
- For military regimes in light of traditional dictatorships;
- For elite-conflict in light of the populace’s determinations;
- For negotiation, collaboration, and contestation,
- Between central state authorities and local social forces.
- Political trajectory analysis has been captured by Charrad, for instance:
- How did women’s rights advance in North African Islamic societies?
- For the state adopted some radical personal status laws in Tunisia,
- Entirely conservative laws in Morocco,
- And relatively conservative laws in Algeria.
- Charrad finds that what mattered was how tribes were integrated,
- And aligned with the state. Thus in Tunisia, where the state,
- Was quite independent of the kin groups in place,
- Tunisia enacted a liberal policy for women to interface.
- Yet in Morocco, where the kin groups with the state belonged,
- Women’s rights were left to Islamic law.
- And in Algeria, where there was a partial alliance with kin crowds,
- The women’s movement could not sustain its cause.
- Integrated political analysis requires large-N and in-depth case studies:
- Account for the divide between qualitative and quantitative methods;
- For big-N studies engaging causal stories—like regression,
- With individual case studies to provide depth to those conceptions.
- As an example, see the World Bank studies on civil war;
- Where econometric models and logit regression to predict,
- The outbreak of the civil war in Africa and Central Asia.
- Truly, opportunities exist for rebels to build a rebellion,
- Depending on precisely the locations that rebels arise from,
- For how is it financed—and what will be the final cost;
- To the rebel, to the citizen, and the population?
- The answers enter the model for future predictions.
- Yet aggregate cases may do much more than reaffirm one norm:
- They can be serious observations revealing rigorous differences,
- Which may be used for the benefit of future development,
- As appropriate from state to state, or region to region.
- They may be serious limitations to big-N findings,
- Which could more wisely be observed via unity,
- Or disunity in dissident regions. There are implications.
- The former were on-the-line cases; but nesting is off-the line:
- Large-N findings do paint phenomenon with broad strokes,
- And the evidence may foil or disturb common notions.
- For example, Haddad (2007) researches volunteering in Japan;
- There is a systematic bias for embeddedU.S.type organizations,
- Interacting with the state, and, individuals amongst organizations.
- Meaning, observable volunteering is higher in Japan than the U.S.,
- Which is a direct contradiction to previous quantitative studies.
- For example, recall the prevailing wisdom about oil economies:
- The determinism of oil in creating instability or longevity;
- Meaning, political constraints are constant for oil exporting states.
- In Indonesia, the government used oil to finance institutions,
- Especially their taxes. This strengthened populace/state bonds!
- Yet in Iran, through comparing the same historical political time,
- The government fell; as weak state/people institutions weren’t built upon!
- Thus these governments were not using the oil money,
- To build a repressive apparatus—as some big-N hypothesis predicted.
- Hence, prevailing wisdom may be outright overturned,
- And cause a shift in political thought and political learning.
Coffee break. Group hypothesis.
Collaborate with creativity; address:
Design a model for structural fault-lines,
Using state, regime, capitalism, or societal binds.
- Skocpol engages comparative historical analysis.
- She shows a causal relationship using J. S. Mill’s
- “Method of Agreement” [i.e., common a set of causal factors,
- With an expected variance that might seem causally relevant] and;
- “Method of Difference” [contrast of cases in which the phenomenon,
- And the hypothesized causes are present to other cases in which,
- The phenomenon and the causes are both absent, yet otherwise,
- Just the same to the positive cases classified].
- Skocpol states, “the key to successful structural analysis
- Lies in a focus on state organizations and their relations
- Both to international environments and to domestic classes
- And economic conditions.”
- She focuses on larger structures like international structures
- And world-historical developments.
- It is not simply the structure within a society; but rather,
- The “internationally uneven spread of capitalist economic development”
- That affects social revolutions—in these matters.
- Social revolutions are comprised of four interrelated processes:
- (1) Old regime collapses;
- (2) A revolt from below;
- (3) A transfer of power to revolutionary radicals;
- (4) Revolutionary vanguards take strong measures
- To transform state and society together.
- The first two processes are social revolutionary situations.
- The last two processes are social revolutionary outcomes.
- There is a relationship worth discovering,
- Between the pressures on the state from the international system,
- And relations between state and ruling class therein:
- Focus on multiple aspects of the old regime,
- And pay close attention to the social-revolutionary situations.
- To explain social-revolutionary outcomes,
- Please explain the interactions between the multiple actors,
- Exacting power and the rise of the new regime:
- What were the lower-class organizational capacities?
- What were post-insurrection state building strategies?
Note to self: Avoid a long discussion about Marxists.
However: Ask for legitimate goals to call for revolution.
When should groups fight against the nexus of state/state,
state/economy, and state/class observations?
Is there a tipping point—a model—reliable diagnostics?
- Moore focuses on structure within a single state,
- While Skocpol focuses on the larger superstructure.
- Moore focuses on the various classes within society,
- And their relationship(s) in the game of legitimate authority.
- These include the land owning upper classes, the peasantry,
- The monarchy, and the clergy.
- Today, account for observable power-holding entities.
- Who are the major players developing policy?
Students write hypothesis.
Transition to structure for people.
- Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi,
- Research the state, capitalism, and importantly—society.
- They reaffirm that economic development is related,
- To the stability of developed democracies.
- However, they tackle a hypothesis put forth Huntington, et al.:
- That democracy undermines economic development;
- Since it unleashes great pressure for instant consumption,
- At the cost of investment, hence, at the cost of growth.
- Thus democracy may not be a wise long-term investment.
- Along this train of thought: poor people desire immediate consumption,
- Of the latest iPod, iPad and iPhone in production.
- In a democracy, workers wisely organize and hire an entrepreneur,
- To bargain for their deserved higher wages.
- This reduces profits and also reduces investments, to be clear.
- In a democracy, all people may vote, and so the politicians need,
- The poor-middle classes constituency to support their platform speech.
- Thus the government pleases the constituency through a welfare state,
- Either by tax and redistribution, or, pork barrel projects.
- Thus there is a limited amount of government investment,
- Into the economic development scene—thus slower growth occurs,
- In a democracy, than in a dictatorship.
- Along another train of thought [in favor of democracy],
- There is allocative efficiency:
- In a democracy, public officials more wisely allocate resources,
- Because authoritarian officials are not responsible,
- To the electorate since they have no recourse.
- In a dictatorship, officials have an incentive to maximize,
- Economic development and total output; yet,
- ‘Tis only attributable to their own rents [or profits].
- Therefore, democracies better protect property; importantly,
- This provides investors a long-term perspective, indeed.
- Both trains of thought may be true:
- Democracies may hinder investment compared to dictatorships.
- Democracies may foster growth by promoting allocative efficiency too.
- Productive forces may be accelerated under dictatorships, conversely,
- The uses of resources may be much more efficient under democracy.
- Now let’s look at the evidence provided by Przeworski and company.
- First, there is no evidence that a democracy undermines investment opportunity,
- Regardless of the wealth of the democracy in action. Poor countries
- Invest little—no matter the type of regime as transaction.
- Democracies benefit more from technical progress,
- And labor is utilized more wisely and effectively—albeit
- Dictatorships more efficiently employ physical labor stock.
- Political regimes have no impact on the rate of growth of total income,
- Between poor and wealthy countries.
- Meaning, poor countries are too poor to afford a strong state,
- And without a strong state, there is little room for great strides,
- In economic development, regardless of regime type.
- Investment is low in poor dictatorships and poor democracies,
- Przeworski and company find.
- Meaning, wealthy countries have an impact on resource use;
- How much people produce, and working wages as labor revenue.
- Yet dictatorships use factor inputs and gain little productivity benefits.
- For labor is a capital stock—and the labor force has few options,
- Dictatorships repress workers and exploit them. They use them
- Carelessly along the train of economic development.
- On the other hand, democracies allow workers to fight for their interests,
- Workers are much better paid and maintain better working conditions.
- Workers thus prefer democracy to dictatorship,
- Hence workers may demand democracy to fruition.
- So in researching structure; please perceive,
- The factors that differentiate Bridge A and Bridge B,
- Such as wealthy dictatorships from wealthy democracies,
- Are the patterns—not the averages—worth studying.
 Lichbach and Zuckerman. 2009. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure. Cambridge University Press.
 This begins an analysis of Migdal. 2009. “Researching the State,” Chapter 7 in; Lichbach and Zuckerman. 2009. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure. Cambridge University Press.
 Migdal attributes this to Krasner 1999.
 Charrad. 2001. From Lichbach and Zuckerman, page 181.
 Skocpol. 1979. States and social revolutions: a comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. Page 291. Emphasis in original.
 Page 14.
 Page 19.
 This begins a brief analysis of Przerworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi. 2000. Democracy and development : political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990. Cambridge U.K. New York: Cambridge University Press.